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LAWRENCE T. BURICK
there seems to be no sufficient reason why the
accused should be unconditionally released merely
because of some error committed at trial unless
such a retrial would violate the basic policies
supporting the double jeopardy guarantee.
One author has argued that allowing a de-
fendant to be retried after reversal of a prior
conviction exposes him to the same evils that the
Court denounced so vigorously in Hentenyi, i.e.,
harassment, inordinate vexation and excessive
expenses, and only because of al error by the
prosecution.53 The point we are logically led to is,
if we are willing to say that the defendant should
not be retried for first-degree murder after a
second-degree murder conviction is reversed
because of the evils of repeated prosecutions,
then it must also be a violation of due process to
retry him at all for any crime. The trouble with
this contention is that logic is only a tool by which
justice is achieved and not an end in itself. In this
case the courts have decided that they are only
willing to go so far in protecting the defendant's
interest in being free from these evils; that society
demands that he not be released until he has a
trial free from error for some offense. Furthermore,
this still leaves open the possibility that the
appellate court might find the prosecution's
conduct so outrageous that to retry the defendant
would be unconstitutional. But, this decision should
be left to the courts.
3 Abstract, supra note 39, at p. 62.
This right of reprosecution, however, should
be limited to the offense of which the defendant
was convicted at the first trial. In the usual case
of a lesser-included offense it seems that it would
be grossly unfair to force the defendant to submit
to a trial for an offense of which he was impliedly
acquitted, since the jury by convicting him of the
lesser offense must have felt that the facts did
not warrant a conviction of the greater. In any
case, as stated in Green, the jury was given full
opportunity to render a verdict on the greater
offense and no extraordinary circumstances
prevented it from doing so. The rationale ex-
pounded by many courts to support reprosecution
for the greater offense is no solution because of
the separability of the two crimes and the inherent
unfairness in forcing a defendant to "waive" a
prior acquittal of one offense in order to appeal
a conviction of another. Finally, it was noted
that the decision in Green was based impliedly
on the deterrence to the defendant's post-con-
viction remedies which exist under these circum-
stances and which, in the Courts' opinion, out-
weigh any societal interest in conviction for the
greater offense.54 If this is the true basis for the
Court's conclusion, then it can be logically ex-
tended to the case of greater penalty on retrial
even though the notion of implied acquittal is
inapplicable there.
54 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957).
Cf. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1948).
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS ACT
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The complex legal problems posed by the sex
offender present nearly insuperable difficulties and
the solutions are far from clear. The object of this
article is to explore one attempted solution, the
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.' The
statute's key provisions, its purposes, and its
implementation in practice will be examined; the
constitutional and policy ramifications will be
discussed; and legislative proposals for revision
will be suggested.
I ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38 §§105-1.01-12 (1965) (here-
inafter references to Chapter 38 of the Criminal Code
of Illinois will be by section number only).
TnE STATUTE AND ITS PURPOSES
The statute provides that if a person has
.. demonstrated propensities toward acts of
sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of
of children," 2 and if he has been suffering from a
mental disorder for at least one year prior to the
filing of a required petition,3 then he is considered
a sexually dangerous person4 and will be com-
2 §105-1.01.
3Id.
4 Id. Most state statutes call the mentally ill sex
offender a sexual psychopath. E.g., D.C. CODE ch. 22
§3503 (1967). By adopting the label "sexually dangerous
person," the Illinois Legislature presumably hoped to
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mitted to the custody of the Director of Public
Safety for an indefinite period of time until he has
recovered from his illness.'
This statutory scheme reflects two purposes of
the act. First, the requirement that the person
must demonstrate criminal propensities to com-
mit sex offenses reflects the Illinois Legislature's
exercise of the State's police power to protect the
community from dangerous sex offenders. 6 That
the mentally ill offender is committed to a mental
institution reflects the second purpose of the act-
rehabilitation.7 Ordinarily, the sex offender is
fined or imprisoned to punish and rehabilitate him.
Psychiatrists, however, urge that these conven-
tional forms of punishment will not help the
mentally ill offender. Instead, they believe that
the mentally ill sex offender should be hospitalized
and given special psychiatric treatment in order
to maximize the rehabilitative effort. It is for this
reason that the mentally ill sex offender, who is
also sexually dangerous, is singled out from the
other sex offenders for special therapy in a mental
hospital.8
Furthermore, consistent with this rehabilitative
purpose, the person is confined until he has "re-
covered." 9 The period of confinement is not for a
fixed period of time related to the seriousness of
his offense; rather, it is for an indeterminate period
of time, a, period related to the individual's needs
and responses and to the time necessary to cure
him. 0
In addition, the rehabilitative purpose is re,
flected in the procedural framework of the statute.
To prevent persons from being punished for
avoid the problems of a vague definition based on the
now rejected psychiatric term, "psychopath." But see
text at n. 108-124, infra.§105-8.
6 People v. Juergens, 407 Ill. 391, 397, 95 N.E.2d
602 (1950); REPoRT or THE IILINOIS CoussioN ON
SEX OFFENxDERS TO =E 68TH ASSEMBLY OF TH= STATE
OF IIaNOis 1 (1956) (hereinafter cited as Ir~uois
REPORT); Note, Confinement of the Sexually Irrespon-
sible, 32 J. Cnm. L. & C. 196 (1941); Minow, The
Illinois Proposal to Confine Sexual Psychopaths, 40
J. C=ns. L.C. & P.S. 186, 196-97 (1949).
7Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary
and Analysis, 51 J. Cmn. L., C. & P.S. 215 (1960);
Hacker & Frym, A Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice:
A Critical Discussion, 43 CAI". L. REv. 766 (1955);
Tappan, Some Myths About the Sex Offender, 19 FED
PROB. 7 (June, 1955); ILLiNois REPORT, supra note 6
at 1; MicmGAw REPORT ON THE DEVIATED SEX OF-
FENDER 3 (1951).8 Id.
9 §105-8.
10 TAPPAN, CRIME, JUsTIcE AND CORREcnON 345
(1960). See text at n. 46-54, infra.
crimes committed while suffering from a mental
disorder, the statute provides that the State's
Attorney may initiate a civil proceeding prior to
indictment to determine whether the individual is
a sexually dangerous person.u If he is declared a
sexually dangerous person, then he is confined to
the state hospital." If, however, he is found not to
be a sexually dangerous person, then he may be
tried for the crime for which he is charged."3
IMPLEMENTATION OF TE STATUTE
The statute, as implemented, may be criticized
on two grounds. First, although the statute was
presumably enacted in response to violent sex
offenders who pose a serious menace to society, 4
the Illinois data indicate that over 50% of those
hospitalized are non-violent persons-for example,
Peeping Toms or exhibitionists-whose acts are
passive and merely morally offensive."' Appar-
11 §§105-3-3.01; People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill.2d 261,
139 N.E.2d 776 (1957); People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472,
47 N.E.2d 703 (1943).
"§105-8.
"Compare Ohio: BALnwrn's Onro REv. CODE
ANN. ch. 29 §2947.27 (1964). (The statute is invoked
after conviction; if the person was confined for a period
less than the maximum sentence for the offense of which
he was convicted, then he is transferred to a penal
institution to serve the remainder of his term.); New
Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 2A:1643 (1953). (Offender
is released after being confined for the maximum time
he would have served f imprisoned.); Michigan: MicH.
STAT. ANN. ch. 287 §28.967 (1954). ("Psychopathy"
is a defense to the crime charged.).
14 Tappan, supra n. 7 at 7.
5 IuNos REPORT, supra n. 6 at 14. The data was
based upon an examination of the sixty-two commit-
ments between 1938 and 1952: thirty-one persons were
non-violent offenders (twenty-three, indecent exposure;
eight, contributing to the delinquency of a minor); the
balance were violent offenders (ten, crime against
nature; five, rape; three, assault to rape; one, assault
to kill; three, incest). The total does not equal sixty-
two; apparently the committee counted the category
contributing to the delinquency of a minor twice.
Based on a later study, Dr. Groves B. Smith, Director
of the Psychiatric Division of the Illinois Department
of Safety, reported that over two-thirds of those com-
mitted were non-violent. SSuTH, THEm THERAPEUTiC
POssiBiLIrIEs AND THE LEGAL DsFicur TEs EN-
COUNTERED IN A 20 YEAR ExPERIENcE IN THE PSY-
cHIATRIc DmsioN, ILLINOIs, DEPARTMENT OF PuBLIc
SAFETY, MENARD, ILINoIs (1963) (hereinafter cited
as SmTr REPORT). Dr. Kelleher, Director of the Be-
havioral Clinic associated with the Municipal Court,
Cook County, Illinois, indicated in an interview with
the author that today, for the most part, in Cook
County, the statute is used only to commit the most
violent offenders. Only during the 1950's was the act
used with any frequency to commit non-violent of-
fenders. Interview with Dr. Kelleher, April 4, 1967.
Unfortunately there is no data available to indicate
how many violent offenders are not committed under
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ently non-violent offenders are being committed
under the act because in practice only recidivists
are hospitalized" and non-violent offenders are
much more recidivistic than violent offenders. 7
The statute does not explicitly compel this result.
It provides only that those persons who have
been suffering from a mental disorder for at least
one year prior to the filing of the required petition
can be committed."8 However, since psychiatrists
cannot determine how long a person has been
mentally ill, to implement this statutory provision,
the State's Attorneys require that persons must
have committed a sex offense one year prior to the
petition's filing. 19 Thus, since a prior crime must
have been committed, only recidivists are hos-
pitalized. And since non-violent offenders are
very recidivistic, many are hospitalized.
The statute has also been criticized for failing to
fulfill the rehabilitative purpose. As stated ini-
tially, the sexually dangerous person was singled
out from the other sex offenders because it was
felt that he would benefit more from hospitaliza-
tion than from imprisonment. 20 It does not follow
from this premise, however, that all sex offenders
who are dangerous within the statutory terms and
who are mentally ill will benefit from this psychi-
atric treatment. Psychiatrists tell us that not
all mentally ill sex offenders are treatable.n Those
the act. However, Tappan, who has conducted extensive
research in the area, states that:
Most of the cases committed under the legislation
[in the various states] are minor varieties of sex
deviates: peepers, exhibitionists, homosexuals, and
the like. The menacing varieties of sex criminal are
rarely touched in the operation of these laws. Tappan,
supra n. 10 at 414.
16 Interview with Dr. Kelleher; ILLINOIS REPORT
Supra n. 6 at 17.
" ELLIS & BRAncALE, PsYCHoLoGY OF SEX Oz-
FENDERS 33-37 (1956). For example, the EUis-Brancale
Study in New Jersey indicated that of eighty-nine
exhibitionists, thirty-one (34%) were charged with a
prior sex crime and sixty (67%) admitted prior sex
offenses with or without arrest. And of forty-nine
homosexuals, nineteen (30%) were charged with prior
sex offenses and thirty-six (73%) admitted previous
sex offenses with or without arrest. Compared to this,
of twenty-one sexual assaults, three (14%) had pnor
arrests and five (24%0) admitted to such acts previously.
Only one of eight forcible rapists was recidivist; of
sixty-one statutory rapists, only seven (11%) were
recidivists. Id.
Is §105-1.01.
19 Interview with Dr. Kellcher.
20 See text at n. 7-8, Supra.21 The Ellis-Brancale study indicated that of the 257
sex offenders in the mentally disordered categories(mild and severe neurotic, borderline psychotic, psy-
chotic, organic brain impairment, psychopath and
mentally deficient), eighty-four were found commit-
persons who are too old, whose condition has
seriously deteriorated or who have no desire to be
cured will not benefit from psychiatric treatment
no matter how long they are confined in a hos-
pital.2 Only those persons who will respond to
treatment and who want to be cured will bene-
fit."
For this reason, hospitalization for an indeter-
minate period, the rehabilitative alternative to
imprisonment, can only be justified if the persons
committed are deemed treatable. However, in
practice, the State's Attorneys, when they file
the sexually dangerous persons petition, do not
initially consider whether or not the person is
treatable.n Instead, if they feel that they have
enough evidence to establish their criminal case
beyond a reasonable doubt, they do not file a
petition, and instead proceed to trial. Only when
they feel they do not have enough evidence to
convict, do they file a petition under the statute.
2 5
Hospital commitment under the act is still possible
even though there is not enough evidence to con-
vict under the criminal law, since the sexually
dangerous persons proceeding is a civil hearing
and does not require proof of the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, at
the hearing itself, psychiatric testimony of the
person's amenability to treatment at a mental
hospital is not permitted; instead, the examining
psychiatrist can only testify whether the person is
".... suffering from a mental disorder... coupled
with criminal propensities to the commission of
sex offenses .... ", 26 Thus, since treatability is not a
factor considered by the State's Attorneys when
they file a petition, since the psychiatrist cannot
testify whether the person will benefit from treat-
ment at a mental hospital and since all sexually
dangerous persons are not treatable, it is very
likely that non-treatable persons are committed
under the statute.
Based on this initial analysis of the implementa-
table; 173 were found non-committable. ELLs &
BRANcALE, Supra n. 17 at 46.
"People v. Willey, 128 Cal.App.2d 148, 275 P.2d
522 (1954); SmTm REPORT Supra n. 14; ELLIs &
BRANCALE, Supra. n. 17 at 79.
2Id.
24 Interview with Dr. Kelleher April 4, 1967. This
also seems to be the practice in other jurisdictions.
TAPPAN, Supra n. 10 at 414; PEinnMARY REPORT OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEX CRIMES o TE ASSEMBLY
INTERIM ComnTrEr ON JuICIAL SYSTEM AND JuDIcIAL






tion of the statute's purposes, in the balance of
this article the following will be suggested: 1)
The statute is constitutional in so far as it permits
commitment of treatable offenders, thus effectuat-
ing the rehabilitative purpose. However, to the
extent that non-treatable persons are committed,
the statute, as implemented, violates the Due
Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clauses of the United States Constitution and is
unconstitutional as applied. 2) So long as non-
violent offenders are treatable, the state police
power permits their commitment; however, for
policy reasons non-violent offenders should not
be committed. In additioi, it will be suggested
that the Illinois statute be repealed and be re-
placed by a post-conviction commitment pro-
ceeding that would be part of the judge's sen-
tencing power.
COmaITMENT OF NON-TREATABLE SEX
OFFENDERS
It is well settled that the state legislature can
act within its police power to single out for special
treatment the sexually dangerous person from the
larger class of all sex offenders.Y In Pearson v.
Probate Courl,n the United States Supreme Court
held that the class selected, be it the sexual psy-
chopath or the sexually dangerous person, would
constitute a dangerous element which the state
legislature in its discretion could put under appro-
priate control. 29 Although the sexual psychopath
is not the entire class of sex offender, the legisla-
ture is free to recognize degrees of harm and it
may confine its restrictions to those classes of
cases where the need is the dearest.0
The state's police power is not unlimited, how-
ever; its scope is limited by the Equal Protection31
and Due Process requirementsn of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause
permits special treatment of some persons who
are part of a larger group only so long as the clas-
sifications are reasonably related to the objectives
2 Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
See also Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d
897 (1952); People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 47 N.E.2d 703
(1943); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d
18 (1942).
2 Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270,275 (1940).29 Id.
30 Id.31M orey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Although
this case discusses equal protection in an economic
context, the general principles enunciated should also
apply here.
a Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 276-77
(1940).
of the legislation." In addition the Due Process
Clause requires that the administrators' exercise
of their power must be reasonably related to the
purposes of the act.4 Once both requirements are
met, the person cannot object that he is unreason-
ably deprived of his liberty. 5
Applying this analysis to the Illinois act, the
statutory differentiation between mentally ill,
sexually dangerous persons and all other sex
offenders satisfies the Equal Protection require-
ments that the classification be reasonable and
related to the objectives of the legislation. There
are mentally ill sex offenders who do not respond
to the traditional criminal sanctions36 who would
benefit from psychiatric treatment in a mental
hospital.D Furthermore, assuming treatability,
there are psychiatric methods available which
will benefit such a person., Therefore, singling
out the mentally ill offender for special treatment
is reasonably related to the rehabilitative purpose
of the act. In addition, some dangerous offenders
are mentally ill and, therefore, their commitment
is reasonably related to the protective purpose of
the statute.3 9
-"Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463 (1957); Swan-
son, supra n. 7 at 220.
3 Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 276-77
(1940).
35 Swanson, supra n. 7 at 220.36 See text at n. 7-8, supra.
37 GurnmcHR & WEIROFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 112-22 (1952). For example, the pedophiliac (child
molester) is often a passive, immature and insecure in-
dividual who lacks courage to make sexual sontact with
his contemporaries. Id. at 115. And some of the acts of
the forcible rapist have been explained as explosive ex-
pressions of pent-up impulses. Id. at 116-17.
8 For example, Dr. Smith has stated that:
A major treatment procedure is a concept called
socio-shock therapy, or the impact felt by the
inmate when transplanted from the free community
at the onset of diagnostic studies.... For the first
time they realize the seriousness of their behavior
and the association with a group of degenerated
sex offenders makes them realize the direction in
which their lives were headed. Srm REPORT,
supra n. 15.
Other recommended treatment is electroshock therapy,
brain surgery, tranquilizers, and, in some states, sterili-
zation and castration. GTTMAcnER & EIVmorEN,
supra n. 37 at 134. Many question the effectiveness of
any treatment. See, e.g., Swanson, supra n. 7 at 224.
However, for the purposes of this article, it will be
assumed that, if a person is deemed treatable, then there
is treatment that can be given.
If the sex offender is not receiving such treatment,
additional constitutional questions arise which are
beyond the scope of this paper. For a good general
discussion, see Note, Due Process for All: Constitutional
Standards for Involuntary Commitment and Release,
34 U. CHI. L. REv. 633 (1967).39Errs & BRANcArm, supra n. 17 at 46.
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Moreover, the statute is not deficient because
the legislature specified that only those mentally
ill sexually dangerous persons who"... demon-
strated propensities toward acts of sexual assault
or acts of sexual molestation of children... 40
should be singled out for special psychiatric
treatment. Even though there are other dangerous
sex offenders who would benefit from psychiatric
treatment, the legislature is permitted to under-
classify, that is, to single out only some from a
larger class of persons all of whom are tainted
"with the mischief at which the law aims." 41
Thus, the statute appears to satisfy the Equal
Protection requirements of the United States
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court,
however, in Pearson v. Probate Court42 while
upholding the constitutionality of the Minnesota
statute on its face, suggested that it was still
an open question whether the statute, in its
application, might violate the Due Process Clause
and be unconstitutional as applied. The Court
stated:
We fully recognize the danger of deprivation
of due process.. . and the special importance
of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in
a class of cases where the law though fair on its
face and impartial in appearance may be open
to serious abuses in administration.0
It is arguable that the Illinois act, "though fair
on its face and impartial in appearance," " is
unconstitutional as applied. As stated, the admin-
istrators' exercise of their power must be reason-
ably related to the purposes of the act.45 Therefore,
both the protective and rehabilitative purposes of
the statute must be fulfilled. The person must not
only be deemed sexually dangerous to effectuate
the protective purpose but, to promote the re-
habilitative purpose, the person must also be
deemed amenable to psychiatric treatment. If
40 §105-1.01.
41 [This] piecemeal approach to a general problem,
permitted by under-inclusive classifications, appearsjustified when it is considered that legislative dealing
with such problems is usually an experimental matter.
It is impossible to tell how successful a particular ap-
proach may be, what dislocations might occur, what
evasions might develop, what new evils might be
generated in the attempt to treat the old. Legislators
may wish to proceed cautiously, and courts must allow
them to do so. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal .Protec-
tion of the Laws, 37 CArir. L. REv. 341, 346,349 (1949).
41309 U.S. at 270 (1940).4 1 Id. at 276-77.
44 Id.
45 Swanson, supra n. 7 at 220.
either purpose is not satisfied, the act, as im-
plemented, must be considered unconstitutional
as applied.
Applying this analysis to the Illinois practice, it
is arguable that since treatability is not a factor
considered as part of the commitment procedure
and since the act appears to be invoked only when
the State's Attorneys feel they cannot get a
criminal conviction, only the protective purpose
is satisfied and the statute serves only as a con-
venient expedient to confine non-convictable
persons. Therefore, to the extent that the re-
habilitative purpose is not satisfied, the statute
violates the Due Process Clause and is unconstitu-
tional as applied.
Moreover, it is arguable that the commitment
of non-treatable offenders for an indeterminate
period of time also violates the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
While this provision ordinaily is used to contest
assertedly torturous and agonizing punishment, 4'
it may be applicable in this context as well.
Society as a whole has four interests which
justify punishing an offender for his crime.0 First,
there is the interest in confining an offender to
protect the community from his future offenses.
Second, there is an interest in deterring others
from committing the same crime. Third, society is
interested in rehabilitating an offender so that
when he is ultimately released he will no longer
pose a danger to the community. Finally, society
has an interest in confining a criminal to exact
retribution-to require him to pay his debt to
society for his criminal conduct.
When punishment is prescribed for various
offenses, the legislators consider these societal
interests. At the same time, however, they also
must consider the interest of the defendant not to
be unreasonably deprived of his freedom. 49 There-
fore, the interests of society and of the individual
must be balanced and the length of confinement
must be reasonably related to the nature and
seriousness of the offense. 49 In practical effect this
means that the state legislature must fix a maxi-
46 Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960).47 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910);
Williams v. United States, 157 F.Supp. 871, 876
(D.C.D.C. 1958); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punish-
inent Clause and Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HAav. L.
Rxv. 636-37 (1966); TAPPAN, stpra n. 10 at 238. The






mum term of confinement for each statutory or
common law offense. 0 The more serious the crime,
the greater the term of confinement because of
the greater need to protect society, to deter others,
to exact retribution and to rehabilitate the crimi-
nal completely.51 In this manner, the rights of the
individual are balanced with the rights of society,
so that the offender is not unreasonably deprived
of his liberty, while society is still protected.
The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,
however, departs from this approach. The length
of institutional confinement is not proportionate
to the nature and seriousness of the offense. The
hospitalization is for an indeterminate period of
time since the person is not released until he has
recovered.52
This departure may be justified as the best way
to promote the rehabilitative purpose of the
statute.5 Thus, since it is impossible to determine
initially how much time is necessary to rehabili-
tate a particular person, no fixed term is set; rather,
the length of hospitalization is ultimately de-
pendent upon the individual's particular needs
and his response to treatment.5 However, it is
submitted, if the mentally ill offender is not
treatable and would not benefit from psychiatric
treatment, then the departure from the conven-
tional fixed term approach would violate the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
Before this argument can be made, however,
it must first be determined whether the clause is
applicable to a state civil commitment. It is well
settled that the clause itself applies to the states.5
But other points are not so clearly settled. For
example, it can be argued that the clause applies
only to post-conviction confinement in criminal
cases, and is not applicable here since the sexually
dangerous persons proceeding is a civil hearing
prior to indictment.5 6 This may no longer be true
in Illinois, however, since the Illinois cases have
been gradually departing from this civil-criminal
approach.Y The courts, recognizing that the per-
50 TAPPAx, supra n. 10 at 432.
51 Id.
§105-8.
63 People v. Kaganovitch, 1 App.Div.2d 680, 146
N.Y.S.2d 565 (1955), affd, Kaganovitch v. Wilkins,
305 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 929
(1962).
5TArPPs, supra n. 10 at 435.
55 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962);
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
56 Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409,
204 N.W. 140 (1925).
57 People v. Beshears, 65 Ill.App.2d 446, 201 N.E.2d
35 (5th Dist. 1965); People v. McDonald, 44 Ill.App.2d
son is deprived of his liberty when involuntarily
confined, require that procedural due process
guarantees be a part of the sexually dangerous
persons proceeding." Thus, in People v. Capoldi,59
the Illinois Supreme Court held that even though
the proceeding was civil, the Due Process Clause
required that a confession could not be admitted
into evidence until the State had proven to the
judge out of the jury's presence that the confession
was voluntary. The court stated:
Insofar as the present requirements of due
process are concerned, it is of little signifi-
cance that the proceedings are civil in nature.
A defendent found to be a sexually dangerous
person under the act is deprived of his liberty
as a consequence, and must be accorded the
protections of due process at his trial.60
On the other hand, because only procedural Due
Process guarantees have been incorporated into the
civil proceedings, it is arguable that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment clause does not apply since
it is concerned with punishment, not procedure.
However, an extension of the Capoldi doctrine
348,194 N.E.2d 541 (2d Dist. 1963); People v. Nastasio,
19 Il.2d 524, 168 N.E.2d 728 (1960); People v. Capoldi,
10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776 (1957). Compare People v.
English, 31 Ill.2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964).
E Id.
59 10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776 (1957).
60 Id. at 267, 139 N.E.2d at 779.
In People v. English, 31 I11.2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455
(1964), however, the court departed from the Capoldi
decision. In that case, the court limited the alleged
sexually dangerous person's self-incrimination privilege.
The holding was that the individual was not required to
disclose to the examining psychiatrist prior unpunished
crimes but must disclose non-incriminatory information.
The court said:
[It is natural that some of the safeguards which
are applicable in a criminal prosecution be applied
to the [civil] proceedings... [TIhis does not mean,
however, that the commitment proceeding is a
criminal prosecution or that criminal procedure as
a whole must be followed. Id. at 304, 201 N.E.2d.
at 458.
Nevertheless, the English case is an exception to the
general rule and all the other cases have consistently
incorporated due process guarantees into the Sexually
Dangerous Persons proceeding; for example, the right
to a speedy trial, People v. Beshears, 65 Ill.App.2d 446,
213 N.E.2d 55 (5th Dist. 1965), and the right to con-
front witnesses, People v. Nastasio, 19 Il.2d 524, 168
N.E.2d 728 (1960). Apparently the court found it
necessary to depart from the Capoldi approach in the
English case to support the rehabilitative purpose of the
statute. If the court had held that the person was not
required to talk with the psychiatrist at all, then it
would be impossible to determine the individual's
mental condition. Thus, to permit the statute to be
used at all, the court held that non-incriminating
information must be given.
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would be consistent with the rationale of the case.
As stated, the court has been incorporating due
process guarantees into the civil proceeding be-
cause of its recognition that the sexually dangerous
person, when committed is deprived of his free-
dom. 61 Similarly, the purpose of the Eighth Amend-
ment is also to prevent individuals from being un-
reasonably deprived of their freedom.6 2 There-
fore, on the rationale of Capoldi and subsequent
cases the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provision
should also be part of the guarantees in a civil
hearing.
There are no Illinois cases directly on point. In
an unrelated context, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to apply
the Eight Amendment to a civil proceeding under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act.6 But the Fourth
Circuit, in an action under another civil statute
did not adhere to the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit, stating in dicta that:
[W]hile the Eight Amendment has been gen-
erally thought to apply to criminal cases, there
would seem to be no basis in reason why a
court could not invoke the Eight Amendment
either specifically or by analogy, to prevent an
abuse of the power of punishment though it be
only manifested in civil form.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act is clearly civil
in nature since only civil penalties are imposed. On
the .other hand, the Sexually Dangerous Persons
proceeding is potentially and in practice a source of
much greater abuse of power since the consequence
is not a fine but indefinite detention in a mental
hospital. For this reason, the Seventh Circuit's
construction of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
should not be controlling. When the consequence
of an act is indeterminate detention in a mental
hospital, the restrictions of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause should apply.
Assuming that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause is applicable in a civil proceeding, a
second problem remains: can confinement in a
mental institution with the purpose of rehabilita-
tion and treatment be considered punishment?
Dean Francis Allen of the University of Michi-
gan Law School argues that involuntary confine-
61 See text at n. 57-60, supra.
1 See text at n. 47-51, supra.
6 United States v. Strangland, 242 F.2d 843, 848
(7th Cir. 1957).
1 Toepelman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697, 700(4th Cir. 1959).
ment must be considered punitive even though
the individual is institutionalized to be rehabili-
tated, writing:
Measures which subject individuals to the
substantial and involuntary deprivation of
their liberty contain an inescapable punitive
element, and this reality is not altered by the
facts that the motivations that prompt incar-
ceration are to provide therapy or otherwise
contribute to the person's well-being or re-
form. As such, these measures must be closely
scrutinized to insure that power is being ap-
plied consistently with those values of the
community that justify interference with lib-
erty for only the most dear and compelling
circumstances.6
5
The United States Supreme Court, in Spect
v. Patterson,66 appears to have adopted this posi-
tion. In Specht, the Court held that a convicted
sex offender was denied due process when he was
committed to a mental hospital in lieu of punish-
ment without a hearing. In dicta, the Court com-
mented on the nature of post-conviction commit-
ment for an indeterminate time under a sexual
psychopath law, stating:
[The punishment ... is criminal punishment
even though it is designed not so much as re-
tribution as it is to keep individuals from in-
flicting future harm.Y
Concededly, Specht involved a post-conviction
proceeding and rested on a procedural Due Process
issue. However, the dicta concerning punishment
may be a signal that in a well-documented case
the Court may be willing to hold that the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
clause is applicable when sex offenders are com-
mitted to a mental hospital for an indeterminate
period of time in a civil proceeding prior to
indictment.
Assuming that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment clause is applicable to institutional confine-
ment, it is arguable that the clause is violated to
the extent that the State's Attorney invoke the
statute against nontreatable persons. As noted
above, indeterminate detention of mentally ill
offenders has been justified since it is impossible to
65 A=LEN, TAE BORDERLAND oF CRnuNAL JusncE,
ESSAYS iN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 37 (1964).
66 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
67 Id. at 608-9.
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determine initially how long it will take to re-
habilitate any particular individual.' s However, it
is submitted, if the mentally ill offender would not
benefit from psychiatric treatment, then the
departure from the conventional fixed term ap-
proach could not be justified. The individual could
not be rehabilitated by psychiatric treatment, and
indeterminate detention could only be construed
as a camouflage to rationalize the imposition of
indefinite sentences upon the non-treatable, non-
convictable persons for the protection of society.
This would dearly be in violation of the Eighth
Amendment since commitment of a non-treatable,
non-convictable person would unreasonably de-
prive him of his freedomA9 If he had been con-
victed, he would have been confined for a specified
period of time. But by being hospitalized under
the statute he could conceivably be confined for
the rest of his life even though he would not benefit
from treatment. This result is particularly true in
Illinois, since the statute requires that the patient
cannot be released until he has "recovered."
70
Since the psychiatrist cannot accurately predict
whether the person is no longer dangerous and
therefore has recovered,71 and since the Illinois
Courts require such a showing72 too often offenders
are being confined long after their maximum term
in prison would have been servedY3
Thus, this analysis of the implementation of the
Illinois statute in light of Due Process and Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clauses indicates that
the act is unconstitutional as applied, to the ex-
tent that non-treatable persons are committed to a
mental hospital for an indeterminate period of
time. For this reason, it is recommended that the
statute be amended to require that at the pre-
indictment hearing the psychiatrist must testify
not only whether the person is sexually dangerous
but also whether he will benefit from treatment in
a mental hospital. In this manner both the
protective and rehabilitatative purposes will be
served. If the person is found to be both sexually
dangerous and treatable, he should be committed
to the hospital. If, however, he is found either
harmless or non-treatable, he should not be
63 See text at n. 7-8, supra.
69 See text at n. 47-51, supra.
70 §105-8.
71 Tappan, supra n. 7 at 9-10.
7Interview with Dr. Kelleher, April 4, 1967.
73 Id. Data collected for the years 1938-1952 indicate
that only one-half of those committed were released.
ILrixois REPORT, supra n. 6 at 14. No other data is
available.
committed but rather, should be bound over for
trial, and if not convicted he should be released.
Some writers argue that such an approach
erroneously allows non-treatable, non-convictable,
but dangerous sex offenders to be released.
Conviction, it is said, is often very difficult because
parents of the victim of a sexual attack are
reluctant to allow their young child to testify.7 4
Also, the child may frequently be incompetent to
testify.75 Furthermore, a woman victim may
refuse to testify in order to avoid further em-
barrassmenty 6 Thus, to prevent the release of
dangerous, non-convictable offenders the person
must be committed before a criminal trial even if
there is no evidence to convict him beyond a
reasonable doubt and, presumably, even if he will
not respond to treatment. Presumption of inno-
cence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and other
legal theories "are perfectly proper in their correct
application," 7 it is argued,
[but] they have no more logical place in the
investigation of a known or suspect corrupter
of the minds and bodies of little children than
in the case of the insane person before the
sanity boardYl
Concededly, the approach wiich requires that
treatability be the commitment standard may
result in the release of dangerous, non-convictable,
non-treatable sex offenders to society. Yet, while
it may sacrifice some degree of protection to
society, this approach is necessary to avoid un-
reasonable deprivation of the individual's liberty.
Such a societal sacrifice may at first glance seem
shocking. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that
this is done daily-whenever the State's Attorneys
must release an alleged criminal for lack of evidence
to convict, even though they feel that it is highly
likely that he committed the crime and that he
will commit another crime. If the State fails in its
burden of proof, the criminal must go free. There
is no rational reason to treat the sex offender any
differently.
Furthermore, the sacrifice of societal protection
may be exaggerated. First, the violent offender is
74 Interview with Dr. Kelleher, April 4, 1967; miu-
NoIs REPORT, supra n. 6 at 20.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Reinhardt & Fisher, The Sexual Psychopath and the
Law, 39 J. Cp-m. L.C. & P.S. 734, 739 (1949); Iu Nois




seldom recidivistic, and, while the nonviolent
offender is highly recidivistic, he seldom progresses
to higher and more serious crimes 9 More signifi-
cant, one study indicated that less than three per
cent of all sex crimes involve the use of actual force
in such a way as to physically harm the victim."0
In only twenty per cent of the cases was some
element of force and duress used, and this was of a
"relatively mild nature, and did not cause any
physical injury to the victim of the offense." 81
Thus, releasing non-convictable, non-treatable
offenders to society may not be as harmful as
might be expected, and, to abide by the require-
ments of the Due Process and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clauses, this proposal should
be adopted.
Some states have adopted this approach but
invoke their statute after conviction as part of the
judge's sentencing powers.82 Thus, as part of the
post-conviction sentencing procedure, there is a
thorough psychiatric examination of the sex
offender in a diagnostic facility to determine
whether he would benefit from psychiatric treat-
ment in a mental hospital. If the examining
psychiatrist certifies that the convicted offender
would benefit from treatment, then he is com-
mitted. If, on the other hand, the psychiatrist
concludes that the convicted offender would not
benefit from treatment, he is sentenced under
normal procedures.P
While not constitutionally required, this ap-
proach, as a matter of policy, seems preferable to
the Illinois pre-indictment proceeding. First, since
the person is only confined after he has been
found guilty, there is no possibility that innocent
persons are being confined.8 On the other hand,
in Illinois, while the offender must have committed
a sex crime, punitive consequences result even
though he is not found guilty of a substantive
offense.
In addition, this approach would remove the
discretion of the State's Attorneys to determine
whether or not to invoke the act prior to indict-
ment. No longer would they be able to invoke the
79 ELLIS & BRANcArE, supra n. 17 at 33-37; GurT-
iACHER & WE-iHOEN, supra n. 37 at 115.
80 ELLIS & BRANcALE, supra n. 17 at 32-33.81 !d.82 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 2A: 164-3 (1953).
83Id. Compare California's approach: even if the
convicted sex offender is found treatable, commitment
to a mental hospital is within the discretion of the
sentencing judge. CAL. WELr. & INST. CODE §§5501,
5512 (1966).84 TAPPAN, supra n. 10 at 417.
act against persons when they did not feel they had
enough evidence to convict, since the act would
only be used after conviction.
Moreover, the recommendation has the further
advantage of clarifying the procedural purpose
of the act. The Illinois courts consider the statutory
sexually dangerous persons proceeding to be "not
unlike the statute providing for an inquiry into
the sanity of one charged with crime before trial
on the indictment." 85 This comparison, however,
is of doubtful validity. The purpose of the com-
petency proceeding is to determine whether the
defendant is competent to stand trial. If incom-
petent, then the criminal proceedings are stayed
until recovery, at which time the trial is com-
menced8 On the other hand, the purpose of the
Sexually Dangerous Persons proceeding is to
determine the nature of past behavior, in order to
prevent persons with mental disorder from being
punished for crimes committed while mentally
abnormal; if the offender is committed, the crim-
inal proceedings against him are quashed upon
his release.P Presumably, the rationale is to
prevent double jeopardy objections and to avoid
the criticism that it is illogical to rehabilitate the
offender and then punish him for the crime that he
committed while mentally disturbed. Thus, the
statute's provision for commitment at the point
when the offender is charged with a crime cannot
be justified by a comparison with the competency
proceeding.
Finally, it should be added that the post-
conviction approach does not preclude the com-
mitment of treatable sex offenders under a purely
civil proceeding-like the Mental Health ActS-or
under a voluntary commitment proceeding.89
Here, protected by many constitutional guarantees,
both the individual and society can benefit even
though the offender was not convicted.
LENGTH OF CoNiINEnENT
As stated, while indeterminate detention in a
mental hospital is a deviation from the conven-
tional fixed term approach, so long as the person is
81 People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 476, 47 N.E.2d 703,
705 (1943).
86 §§104-1-2 (person is unable because of physical
or mental condition to understand the nature and
purpose of the proceedings against him or to. assist in
his defense).
8 People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 476, 47 N.E.2d 703
705 (1943); §105-9.
8 ILLINOIS REPORT, supra n. 6 at 5.
89 N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 2A:164-13 (1953).
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treatable this departure is justified to promote the
rehabilitative purpose of the statute. 0 Thus, even
if the confinement has extended beyond the maxi-
mum prison term, if the offender is continuing to
respond to treatment, the rehabilitative purpose is
being served and the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause requirement that the individual not
be unreasonably deprived of his freedom would be
satisfied.
However, although indeterminate detention,
assuming treatability, is constitutional, a few
states, as a matter of policy, have retained a fixed
term approach, requiring that the treatable
offender can only be hospitalized after conviction
for a period not to exceed his maximum prison
term.9" At the end of the maximum period of time,
the person must be released even if it is shown that
he will continue to benefit from psychiatric treat-
ment. The rationale of this approach is that since
the knowledge of proper treatment is so limited and
conjectural, prediction of the offender's future
danger so speculative and the state's institutional
and personnel resources so inadequate, a maxi-
mum term is necessary to protect the interest of the
offender.13
On the one hand, the Illinois indeterminate
detention approach has the advantage of maxi-
mizing the rehabilitative effort. On the other hand,
it is true that treatment, though available, is not
very advanced and prediction of future harm is
impossible to estimate. 4 For this reason, a synthe-
sis of the two approaches may be appropriate.
Thus, the following proposal is suggested: To
prevent unreasonable deprivation of the indivi-
dual's liberty the convicted treatable sex offender
should be committed to the mental hospital for a
term not to exceed the maximum period he would
have served if imprisoned; 9 if the sex offender
recovers prior to the termination of the maximum
term, he should be released on probation;96 since
he has now been rehabilitated, he should not have
to finish the balance of his term in prison. If the
sex offender has not recovered at the end of the
maximum term, and if a psychiatrist believes that
90 See text at n. 53-54, 68-73, supra.91 E.g., N.J. STAT. A~w. ch. 2A:164-6 (1953).
92 Id.
93 TAPPAx, supra n. 10 at 262.
9 4 Tappan, supra n. 7 at 9-10.1N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 2A:164-6 (1953).
16N.J. STAT. A-wN. ch. 2A: 164-8. But compare
California, CAi. WEr.r. & INsT. CODE §5518 (1966);
People v. Thompson, 102 Cal.App.2d 183, 227 P.2d
272 (1951).
continued confinement would not be beneficial,
then the offender must be released. 97 This is
necessary to prevent unreasonable deprivation of
his liberty. Since the person is not treatable, the
departure from the fixed term requirement of the
Eighth Amendment would not be justified. If,
however, at the termination of his maximum term,
the examining psychiatrist certifies that the sex
offender is responding to treatment and would
benefit from continued confinement, then, as a
matter of policy to promote the rehabilitative
purpose, further hospitalization should be permis-
sible.
To prevent abuses by the hospital administra-
tion, detailed reports should be filed by the ad-
ministrator with the court specifying treatment,
progress and all other information that justifies
continued confinement based on the rehabilitative
purpose of the statute.
In addition, to protect the constitutional rights
of the institutionalized offender, the initial de-
termination as to whether continued confinement
is justified should be made at a hearing with all Due
Process guarantees and with the State having a
heavy burden of proof.98
A final proposal should also be made. If during
the maximum term the person is not responding to
treatment and if continued hospitalization would
not be beneficial, then the person should be
transferred to the prison to benefit from prison
rehabilitation available.99 He should not be re-
leased to society since he did not complete his
prison term and has not yet paid his debt to
society. But at the end of his prison term, he must
be released like all other prisoners'0 0
These proposals have many advantages. First,
they properly take into account both the need to
protect society and the interests of the offender.
While it can be argued that such a proposal per-
mits dangerous, unrecovered sex offenders to go
free at the end of their maximum term, this
problem could be alleviated by the state legislature
lengthening the maximum term of confinement for
the violent sex crimes.' Such legislation would be
justifiable as long as the increase in the length of
97 N.J. STAT. ANw. ch. 2A:164-6 (1953). See also
Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 767 (1946).
s Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
99BAranwm's Onio R.v. CoDE AN. ch. 29 §2947.27(1964).
109 See text at n. 95, supra.
101TAPPAw, supra n. 10 at 415.
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confinement is related to the seriousness of the
offense. 01 Since the courts generally give the state
legislature great leeway in fixing maximum pen-
alties, this would probably result in life imprison-
ment for violent sex crimes. In effect, indetermi-
nate detention would result. But it would be justi-
fied since the seriousness of the offense would
warrant lenghty confinement.
Of more importance, this recommendation would
minimize the primary objection to the present
statute--that non-violent offenders are being
confined for an indeterminate period of time.01w
Since the recommendation permits confinement
only for the maximum period of time that the
offender would have been imprisoned, and since
the maximum term for a non-violent sex offender
is minimal (often misdemeanors, with a maximum
sentence of one year in jail), the non-violent offender
would no longer be confined for an indefinite
period unless he was responding to treatment.
Furthermore, it is submitted, the legislature would
not be justified in increasing the maximum term of
imprisonment for non-violent offenses since such
an increase would not be related to the seriousness
of the offense.
Another advantage to the maximum term ap-
proach is that it properly takes into account the
rehabilitative purpose of the act. Whether the
offender is violent or non-violent, confinement,
even beyond the maximum term, is justified so long
as he is responding to treatment.
Furthermore, mandatory release of an offender
confined for his maximum term eliminates one of
the most difficult problems of the present statute:
the psychiatrist's reluctance to release a sex
offender before he is certain that the offender has
"recovered."'0 4 As stated above, the doctor's
hesitancy often is due to the impossibility of
predicting the future potentiality of danger with
any precision and due to the fact that courts
require such provision, with the result that too
often offenders are being confined long after they
should have been released.105 By requiring release
of persons not responding to treatment after the
maximum term has expired, this problem is
eliminated.
To some extent, Illinois has solved this problem
within the context of the present statute with a
102 See text at n. 47-51, supra.
103 TAPPAN, supra n. 10 at 414. See text at n. 108-124,
infra.
104 §105-8.
105 See text at n. 71-73, supra.
recently enacted conditional release provision."0
This provision provides that:
If the Court finds that the patient appears no
longer to be sexually dangerous but that it is
impossible to determine with certainty under
conditions of institutional care that such
person has fully recovered, the Court shall
enter an order permitting such person to go at
large subject to such conditions and such
supervision by The Director as in the opinion
of the Court will adequately protect the
public.0 '
The provision allows the examining psychiatrist
to supervise the sex offender for several years
outside the restrictive institutional environment
but under close supervision, to determine whether
he has adequately adjusted to societal pressures,
and whether he can now cope with his problem.
But, if the offender recidivates, he is recommited.
It could be argued that this conditional release
concept removes most of the objections to the
Illinois pre-indictment approach and that the post
conviction, maximum term proposal is unnecessary.
However, it is submitted, for the reasons already
discussed, that the post-conviction approach is
more desirable. At the same time this does not
preclude the application of the conditional release
concept in the post-conviction context. Thus, if
an individual, because he is responding to treat-
ment, is confined in the mental hospital beyond
the maximum term he would have served in
prison, it is recommended that the hospital
administrator, with court approval, be empowered
to conditionally release the patient to determine
whether he has sufficiently adjusted, so that he can
be permanently released. If he recidivates, he can
be re-committed to the mental hospital since the
release is part of the rehabilitation program. So
long as he is treatable, re-commitment beyond the
maximum term does not violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. However, if a
patient is not responding to treatment, he must be
released at the end of his maximum term and the
conditional release mechanism cannot be applied
to him. Otherwise if the non-treatable person
recidivated, he could be re-hospitalized without
being convicted of his crime. While a person on
parole can be re-committed since his maximum





would have already been confined to a maximum
term and the conditional release and re-commit-
ment for committing a new crime could be used to
permit indeterminate detention of non-treatable
offenders. Thus, since this result would raise the
constitutional problems already discussed, condi-
tional release should only be applied to those
patients who have been confined beyond their
maximum term but are still responding to treat-
ment.
COMMITMENT OF NON-VIOLENT OFFENDERS
As stated, a basic criticism of the Illinois act is
that over 50% of those committed are non-violent
offenders who at most pose a psychological danger
to the community because of their morally offensive
behavior l 8
The Illinois statutory language, however, seems
broad enough to include the commitment of non-
violent persons. Dangerousness is defined as a
demonstration of ".. . propensities toward acts of
sexual assault and acts of sexual molestation of
children.. ..,"0 "Propensities" seems broad
enough to include not only actual force but also
simply touching; and "sexual molestation" could
include not only actual harm but simply the case of
an elderly man who talks to young children while
they sit on his lap.nO
A constitutional argument could be made that
such a broad definition violates the due process
requirement that statutory provisions cannot be
too vague and indefinite."' Nevertheless, the
Illinois Court rejected the argument in People v.
Sims holding the statute constitutional."' This
holding is consistent with the position that the
United States Supreme Court has taken. In
Pearson,"' the Court reviewed a Minnesota court's
construction of a statute that defined sexual
psychopaths as persons who:
[B]y a habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack
of power to control their sexual impulses and
"0s TAPAN, Supra n. 10 at 414.
"09 §105-1.01.
"' Both the toucher and the elderly man who talked
with the children were committed under the statute.
Interviews with Dr. Kelleher, Dr. Haines (Behavioral
Clinic, Cook County Criminal Court) and Attorney
Shelvin Singer (who has handled several cases involving
the statute).
" Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Connally
v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
"'382 Ill. 472, 47 N.E.2d 703 (1943).
1 Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
who, as a result, are likely to attack or other-
wise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on
the objects of their uncontrolled desire."4
Even though "injury, loss, pain or other evil"'15
is even more vague and indefinite than the
Illinois provision, the Court still held that the
definition did not violate the Due Process Clause.n6
This conclusion appears to be the prevailing
view in most if not all state jurisdictions." 7 How-
ever, in the recent case of Millard v. Cameron,"'
the District of Columbia Circuit Court narrowed
the concept of dangerousness. In that case, the
defendant pleaded guilty to indecent exposure.
Judge Bazelon, discussing the Pearson holding,
noted that:
Though the "likely ... injury, loss, pain or
other evil" may be either physical or psycho-
logical, we think it must not involve conduct
that is merely repulsive or repugnant, but that
has a serious effect on the viewer. Otherwise
the definition might be "too vague" and in-
definite" to constitute valid legislation."9
No other jurisdiction has adopted this view and
until the United States Supreme Court rules other-
wise it must be concluded that a broad construction
of the protective purpose of the statute does not
violate the Due Process Clause, and commitment
of psychologically dangerous sex offenders to a
mental hospital is constitutional
This result may not be as objectionable as it
first appears. The state has the police power to,
protect the morals of its citizenry so long as the
means used are reasonably related to the purposes
sought." 0 Thus, as already stated, so long as the
offender, whether violent or non-violent, is treat-
able, then hospitalization, which is the means used,
is reasonably related to the protective and rehabili-
tative purposes sought.2'
Furthermore, in addition to satisfying the
constitution, committing all treatable sex offenders
may be justified on a policy basis. Studies indicate
that there is no correlation between increased
1 4 Id. at 273.
I's Id.
116 Id.
"1 People v. Levy, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 311 P.2d 897(1957); Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d
897 (1950); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4
N.W.2d 18 (1942).
118 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
" Id. at 471.
120 See text at n. 31-35, supra.
' See text at n. 53-54, supra.
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dangerousness of the offender's act and his treat-
ability; that is, both violent and non-violent
offenders appear to benefit equally from psychiatric
treatment in a mental hospital.12 Therefore, there
is no reason to differentiate between the categories;
so long as they are treatable, all mentally ill sex
offenders should be hospitalized.
On the other hand, other policy considerations
could be used to support a statute that commited
only violent offenders. First, because of the
limited resources and personnel available, the act
should be limited to the most violent offenders
where the need for institutionalization is greatest. 12
Second, perhaps the act should be limited to
violent offenders at this point to give the ad-
ministrators an opportunity to experiment and to
determine successes and failures.'2
Since non-violent offenders can benefit from
treatment, but since resources are so inadequate,
it is recommended that the sentencing judge be
encouraged to commit only violent offenders to
the mental hospital. However, if a clear showing is
made that the non-violent offender would benefit
from treatment and if facilities are available, the
judge should be able to commit the non-violent
offender as well. In addition, it is recommended
that the legislature should make intensified efforts
to improve state institutional facilities so that all
convicted offenders will have the oportunity to
receive psychiatric treatment if they would benefit.
CONCLUSION
For constitutional and policy reasons, the
following proposal is recommended:
1. To be committed to the mental hospital, the
offender must be found to be both sexually
dangerous and treatable.
m Erus & BANcA., supra n. 17 at 48-49.
a3 ILuiNois REPORT supra n. 6 at 19.22 Tussman & tenBroek, supra n. 41 at 346.
2. The pre-indictment proceeding should be
discarded and the statute amended so that com-
mitment to a mental hospital will be one of the
alternatives available to the sentencing judge at
the post-conviction sentencing hearing. Thus, after
conviction, the sex offender should be examined by
a psychiatrist. If the psychiatrist certifies that
the convicted offender would benefit from treat-
ment, then he may be committed. If the psy-
chiatrist concludes that the convicted offender
would not benefit from treatment, then he is
sentenced under normal procedures.
3. The offender should be committed for a term
not to exceed the maximum period he would have
served if imprisoned. If during the term of confine-
ment the offender is not responding to treatment,
he should be transferred to prison to serve the
balance of his term. If the offender recovers prior
to the termination of the maximum term, he
should be released on probation. If the offender has
not recovered at the end of the maximum term, he
must be released. If at the termination of his
maximum term, he is continuing to respond to
treatment and would continue to benefit from
continued confinement, he may continue to be
confined so long as he is responding to treatment.
The hospital administrator should be required to
submit periodic reports to the sentencing judge
stating the offender's progress, types of treatment
being used and other pertinent information.
Finally, if the offender is confined in the hospital
beyond his maximum term because he is respond-
ing to treatment, the hospital administrator should
be empowered to conditionally release him to
society to determine whether he has sufficiently
adjusted so that he can be permanently released.
4. If institutional and personnel resources are
inadequate, only violent offenders should be
committed to the mental hospital.
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